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Freedom, republicanism, and workplace democracy 
Keith Breen 
 
School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK 
 
This paper explores the republican case for worker voice in economic enterprises based on the 
ideal of freedom as non-domination, and assesses its merits relative to two influential arguments 
for workplace democratization grounded on freedom understood as autonomy and self-
determination. Two claims are advanced. The first is that the republican case for worker voice 
avoids difficulties associated with these two arguments. The second, however, is that the ideal of 
non-domination is insufficient, that an adequate understanding and defence of workplace 
democracy will also have to make significant reference to freedom understood as autonomy. 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades republicanism has undergone a remarkable revival such that it now 
constitutes a major strand within contemporary political theory. With this revival, freedom 
and its institutional preconditions have once again become a central concern, leading to 
significant developments in our understanding of democracy, citizenship and the 
constitutional underpinnings of a free political order. The impact of republican thinking is not 
limited to these areas, however. Laborde and Maynor (2008, p. 21) were certainly correct in 
predicting ‘republican political economy’ would be a theme ‘of growing importance and 
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relevance in years to come’. Recent examples include republican justifications of basic 
income policies (Casassas and De Wispelaere 2012), property-owning democracy (White 
2012) and green political economy (Barry 2012), to name but a few. 
 The concern of this study is republican interventions in an area of political economy 
having suffered comparative neglect – workplace democracy. Utilizing Philip Pettit’s 
negative ideal of freedom as non-domination, some republicans have argued for workplace 
democratization on the basis of workers’ interests in countering arbitrary managerial 
interference. My goal is to assess the merits of this justification relative to earlier freedom-
centred arguments for democratic firms that draw on a positive ideal of freedom understood 
in terms of self-determination and autonomy. My argument is twofold. I contend, first, that 
the republican non-domination case for worker voice avoids some of the pitfalls of earlier 
freedom-centred arguments for workplace democratization. However, my second claim is 
that the ideal of non-domination is insufficient on its own, that an adequate defence of 
workplace democracy will also have to incorporate, in substantial measure, positive freedom 
understood as self-determination. If this is true, then not only do republican defences of 
worker voice stand in need of revision, but also republican theory itself. 
 The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section sets out the ‘psychological-
support’ and ‘parallel-case’ justifications of democratic firms, focusing on the objections 
levelled against these. The second section explores, attending to the work of Nien-hê Hsieh, 
the republican case for workplace democracy – or, more accurately, ‘workplace 
republicanism’ – and clarifies the ways in which it overcomes the standard sceptical 
objections. In the third section, I offer a critique of Hsieh’s workplace republicanism based 
on wider criticisms of Pettit’s understanding of socio-political freedom. The key points are 
that republican non-domination implicitly relies upon the ideal of autonomy, that an 
exclusive focus on non-domination leads to an impoverished understanding of democracy 
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and that the problem of domination does not fully explain worker dissatisfaction with 
workplace management practices, which requires reference to positive freedom in order to be 
properly understood. I conclude by rebutting the claim that only freedom understood as non-
domination should be the guiding ideal of institutional design. 
 
Two arguments for workplace democracy 
A democratic enterprise is one where workers have an effective right to participate in the 
collective governance of the organization and determine, by themselves or in conjunction 
with others, its internal regulation and future direction. This definition permits a wide variety 
of institutional forms, ranging from worker co-determination of enterprise policies with 
managers and capital owners to cooperativism, where workers both determine policy and 
own the means of production. It also permits significant variations in the form of democracy 
practiced in firms, with direct democracy at one end of the spectrum and indirect, 
representational democracy at the other.  
 The arguments of concern here have been employed to justify various types of 
democratic enterprise. The first appeals to the positive ideals of freedom as self-
determination or autonomy, of deliberating over and rationally determining the course of our 
actions, and of freedom as self-realization, of actualizing and augmenting the capacities 
definitive of mature persons. Drawing on Mill (1972) and Pateman (1970), Joshua Cohen 
terms this justification the ‘psychological-support argument’. The core idea is that the 
vibrancy of democracy at the political level depends upon ‘forms of association “outside” the 
state, particularly in the economy, that strengthen the forms of thought, feeling, and self-
understanding that give substance to democratic citizenship’ (Cohen 1989, p. 28). For Cohen, 
democratic citizenship has two psychological preconditions, namely, an ‘“active character”’, 
citizens who believe they can determine their own futures and have the capacity to effect 
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change, and a ‘sense of the common good’, the willingness to adjudicate in line with general 
interests. Because authoritarian enterprises grant decision-making primacy to managers and 
capital owners, they limit workers’ opportunities for practical deliberation as to the common 
good and for developing their capacities, ‘thereby fostering passivity and a narrower basis of 
political judgement’ that undermines democratic society as a whole (Cohen 1989, p. 29). The 
degree to which citizens act freely and responsibly in the political realm is, in short, 
materially conditioned by the level of freedom and responsibility permitted them in their 
everyday economic life. 
 The second argument, the ‘parallel-case argument’, justifies workplace democracy not 
in terms of its benefits for political democracy, but instead as a corollary of endorsing 
democratic equality and freedom as self-determination at the level of the state. ‘If democracy 
is justified in governing the state’, claims Dahl (1985, p.110), ‘then it must also be justified in 
governing economic enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in governing economic 
enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state’. The concern here is 
defensible distributions of power, the basic premise being that the features of states which 
call for equitable distributions of power and therefore a right to self-determination are also 
features of most workplaces. The state, normatively viewed, is a cooperative association 
governed by general rules binding upon all members and endorsed in terms of their mutual 
advantage. Because citizens are members of a state, have the ability to judge the 
appropriateness of its general rules and, decisively, are subject to the coercive enforcement of 
these binding rules, they have a right to participate in its collective governance. But the same 
rings true of economic enterprises. Just like states, economic enterprises are cooperative 
associations governed by general rules applying to all members and endorsed in terms of their 
mutual advantage. And just like citizens, because workers are members of an economic 
enterprise, have the ability to judge the appropriateness of its general rules and, no less 
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decisively, are subject to the coercive enforcement of these binding rules, they, too, ought to 
have the right to participate in its collective governance (Dahl 1985, pp. 56–62, 113–133; see 
also Cohen (1989, p. 27) and Walzer (1983, pp. 291–303)). Were we to believe otherwise, 
consistency would demand the rejection of democratic self-rule and an acceptance of 
authoritarianism outside the economic realm. 
 These freedom-centred arguments for workplace democratization are not without 
plausibility. This is particularly so with the psychological-support view of the workplace as a 
prime context for fostering the deliberative capacities and virtues definitive of autonomous 
citizenship. It might be objected that there are other spheres of life in which these virtues are 
learned, and that workplace authoritarianism poses no threat to our freedom as citizens given 
our opportunity to exercise our capacities elsewhere (Nozick 1974, p. 246). However, this 
neglects the distinctive role of work within many people’s lives. Unlike leisure pursuits or 
associational activities, which usually occupy us for limited periods, work typically takes up 
a large proportion of our time and is thus likely to have character-forming effects comparable 
to and probably in excess of other areas of life (O’Neill 2008). Indeed, compelling evidence 
exists in support of Adina Schwartz’s (1982, p. 637) contention that individuals within 
hierarchical workplaces performing jobs with little scope for discretion ‘lead less autonomous 
lives on the whole’. In a celebrated study of US employees, for example, researchers 
discovered that the extent to which work activities required discretion had an appreciable 
impact on individuals’ psychological functioning, complex work enhancing their intellectual 
capacities over time and work lacking complexity decreasing these. Furthermore, and 
importantly, the effects of ‘the structural imperatives’ of jobs, in particular ‘those conditions 
that facilitate or restrict the exercise of self-direction in work’, were not limited to the 
workplace but affected ‘workers’ values, orientations to self and society and cognitive 
functioning primarily through a direct process of learning from the job and generalizing what 
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has been learned to other realms of life’ (Kohn and Schooler 1983, p. 297; see also Hauser 
and Roan 2007). Accepting these wide-ranging consequences, it would be unreasonable to 
think working life has little bearing on our ability to act as self-determining citizens. 
 The appeal of the parallel-case argument rests on the close analogies drawn between 
states and enterprises. One key analogy, as indicated above, relates to the coercive power 
enjoyed respectively by state and managerial authorities. As Dahl (1985, p. 115) argues, 
members of economic enterprises, should they contravene managerial directives, are subject 
to sanctions often as ‘severe’ in their consequences as many of the sanctions levelled by state 
agencies against citizens. Indeed, the ultimate economic sanction, dismissal, which 
potentially condemns workers to sustained exclusion from economic activity altogether, is in 
some respects more severe than state sanctions, which ordinarily presume the continued 
membership of citizens in the state and its activities. A further key parallel concerns the 
comparative bindingness of state and enterprise decisions. The standard justification for 
instituting democracy in states but not in workplaces is the compulsory subjection of citizens 
to state rules in contrast to employees’ supposed voluntary subjection to enterprise rules. 
However, the view that membership of economic enterprises is in truth voluntary stands 
belied by the realities faced by many workers (Dahl 1985, p. 114–115; 2001, pp. 251–252). 
Because of the gross inequalities characteristic of real-world capitalism, only a small 
minority can costlessly choose to exit a firm when they disagree with it decisions, just as only 
a minority, buoyed by affluence, can costlessly choose to leave their state. The majority of 
workers, in contrast, would appear as tightly bound to their enterprises as the majority of 
citizens are bound to their states. 
 For all their attractions, the psychological-support and parallel-case arguments are 
subject to objections rendering their plausibility prima facie at best. As regards the former, 
two criticisms are telling. First, the contention that workplace democracy enhances 
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autonomous citizenship is ultimately an empirical claim dependent on contingencies which 
may vary significantly across cases. While some democratic firms may engender virtues 
conducive to a critical outlook and the common good (Elden 1981), others may lead to 
workerism – the narrow pursuit of worker self-interest – and a passive acceptance of wider 
societal prejudices (Greenberg 1981). Second, the quality of democracy at the political level 
might be sufficiently improved by workplace innovations falling far short of granting 
employees governance rights over enterprise policy. If a modicum of self-direction – more 
autonomous working teams on the floor level, say – helped foster a healthy sense of personal 
efficacy and collective responsibility among workers, then the psychological-support 
argument would require no more. Together these objections suggest advocates of workplace 
democracy should exercise caution in relying upon psychological-support arguments. This is 
so because the justification of workplace democratization provided by them is indirect and 
instrumental: according to these arguments, workplace democracy is justified only if it 
augments democracy at the political level. We may instead want more robust defences of 
democratic firms which focus directly on the working environment itself regardless of its 
benefits to political democracy. 
 As for the parallel-case argument, critics have challenged the close analogies drawn 
between states and firms. While managers enjoy coercive power, their power is substantially 
different from the power enjoyed by state agencies in terms of its scope and magnitude 
(Narveson 1992, p. 52). Regarding scope, though the reach of many economic enterprises is 
assuredly extensive, affecting people’s lives in myriad and often injurious ways, the state 
remains singular in claiming the right to discretion over nearly all spheres of life, from the 
international to the familial. Regarding magnitude, the state’s status as the sole association 
possessing legitimate resort to violence to enforce its decisions renders its power unique, at 
least in a de jure sense, in modern societies. To the extent that all this rings true, the analogy 
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between states and firms would appear overdrawn and the parallel case for workplace 
democracy overstated. The parallel between states and firms in terms of the bindingness of 
their decisions has also been disputed. In market societies respecting the right of voluntary 
contract, employees remain formally free to exit firms should they desire (Arneson 1993, pp. 
139–140), whereas the exit of citizens from a state depends upon other states permitting them 
residency. And even if, following Dahl, this formal right of exit is made hollow by workers’ 
circumstances, the appropriate response to that injustice might not be workplace democracy 
in the first instance. Rather than seeking democratic voice for employees, which would not 
address the cause of their exploitation – socio-economic disadvantage – ‘the proper cure’ for 
the excessive cost of exiting firms would instead be ‘a generous welfare state, or, more 
radically, redistribution of property’ (Mayer 2001, p. 243). If such measures can substantially 
lessen the cost of exiting firms, thus making membership in them voluntary in contrast to 
compulsory state membership, then the parallel case for workplace democratization would 
again appear moot. 
 
Non-domination and workplace republicanism 
The republican case for worker voice in firms promises a path beyond these objections. The 
basis of this case, however, is not freedom understood positively, but instead freedom 
conceived negatively as non-domination. For republicans, according to Pettit (1999, p. 165), 
freedom ‘consists, not in the presence of self-mastery, and not in the absence of interference 
by others, but rather in the absence of mastery by others’, that is, in the absence of 
domination understood as arbitrary interference. Unlike the non-arbitrary interference of a 
constitutionally-constrained system of law, which is publicly justified in accordance with 
general interests, domination entails interference by agents that is unaccompanied by 
justifications and fails to ‘track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the 
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interference’ (Pettit 1997, p. 55). Those subject to this arbitrary power experience, akin to 
servants subject to their master’s discretion, a worsening of their situation in three ways: in 
terms of restricted choice and options, in terms of ‘uncertainty’ and an inability to securely 
plan for their futures and, most problematically, in terms of an ‘asymmetry of status’ and 
diminution of their sense of personal worth (Pettit 1997, pp. 82–90; 2001b, p. 351). A free 
social order is one where these evils are minimized and a symmetry of status between persons 
institutionally enshrined. 
 Republicans such as Nien-hê Hsieh have applied Pettit’s theory of non-domination to 
the economic sphere in order to undercut workplace authoritarianism (Hsieh 2005, 2008a, 
2008b; see also González-Ricoy 2014). Hsieh’s argument begins with the commonly 
accepted view that economic organization requires managerial decision-making rights or 
discretion in dealing with day-to-day business and unanticipated contingencies. These 
decision-making rights make possible the organizational flexibility necessary for the success 
of firms, yet they also grant managers extensive power to arbitrarily interfere in workers’ 
lives. Managerial power can be limited by legislation – safety standards, minimum wage 
rates, maximum weekly hours – and by contractual agreements and clear job descriptions, but 
it can never be eliminated by such measures, since no legislative device, contract or job 
description can account for all the contingencies which may arise or dispense with the need 
for discretion in responding to them. The ‘challenge’, therefore, is ‘to protect workers against 
arbitrary instances of interference without ruling out [managerial] discretion altogether’ 
(Hsieh 2008a, p. 92). 
 Vulnerability to managerial domination takes numerous forms (Hsieh 2005, pp. 122–
123; 2008b, p. 64). Most obviously, managers enjoy discretion over the tasks workers 
perform and how they perform them. Examples include decisions concerning work pace, 
allocation of responsibilities, overtime, shift rotations and so forth, which can impact 
10 K. Breen 
 
negatively on the experience of work itself and on life outside the workplace. Managers also 
possess decision-making rights over employees’ conditions of employment, including the 
working environment, remuneration, training opportunities and promotion criteria. Arbitrary 
interference at this level can lead to some workers being consistently disadvantaged in 
comparison to others, thus lessening their career prospects and hindering personal 
advancement. Finally, managers have the right to determine enterprise strategy, ranging, for 
instance, from the choice of product to be produced to the decision to relocate an enterprise, 
which can have far-reaching consequences for employees in subverting their professional 
identity or forcing a wedge between them and their communities. When employed arbitrarily, 
these kinds of managerial discretion severely restrict workers’ choice of options, giving rise 
to uncertainty and limiting their ability to pursue their ends and life plans. Yet they also pose 
a threat, Hsieh (2005, p. 124–126) makes clear, drawing on Rawls, to the primary good of 
‘self-respect’, the precondition of individuals being able to exercise their capacities and act 
independently at all. This is so because arbitrary managerial interference treats workers as 
objects, as if their interests and opinions did not count, thereby undermining, in their own 
eyes and the eyes of others, their status as free and equal persons. 
 It is for these reasons that Hsieh (2008a, p. 92) deems protection against managerial 
domination a ‘basic right’ comparable in importance to other fundamental rights and liberties. 
This right is partially satisfied by external legislative restrictions on workplace interference 
and opportunities for individual legal redress in courts. However, because these restrictions 
and opportunities cannot cover every eventuality and often involve considerable expense, an 
effective right of protection would require a regime in which workers are able ‘to contest 
managerial decisions that result in severe forms of interference not only ex post, but also as 
part of the decision-making process internal to economic enterprises’ (Hsieh 2005, p. 136). 
Based on an interpretation of Pettit’s republicanism as being primarily concerned with 
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placing constraints on governmental authorities and ensuring the contestability of their 
decisions, Hsieh’s terms this regime ‘workplace republicanism’. Unlike workplace 
democracy typically understood, workplace republicanism does not entail employee control 
of enterprise policy, but instead their participation in decision-making processes in ways 
which guarantee that their voice will find register (Hsieh 2005, p. 138). The institutional 
mechanisms securing employee voice vary in accordance with the level of decision making. 
At the level of the performance of tasks, there might be internal ‘adjudicative bodies’ 
responsible for resolving individual disputes between managers and workers, whereas 
managerial decisions affecting collective conditions of employment and enterprise strategy 
would be better dealt with by work committees and by employee representation on boards of 
directors, as is the case in continental European systems of co-determination (Hsieh 2005, pp. 
137, 139). Whatever their institutional guise, only republican arrangements of this sort can 
ensure the resilient defence of workers’ basic interests. 
 Workplace republicanism enjoys distinct advantages over psychological-support and 
parallel-case arguments for workplace democracy. In contrast to psychological-support 
claims, its success does not depend on contingent causal relationships between the experience 
of working life and citizen virtues or on the instrumental benefits workplace democratization 
might have for the quality of democracy at the political level. Although these relationships 
and benefits may hold true, and would bolster the case for strong protections against 
managerial power if they did, they are neither required by workplace republicanism nor its 
focus. Instead, its focus is squarely on enterprise activities themselves, on the effects they 
have on employees qua employees, thus offering a direct, rather than indirect, justification for 
worker voice. And unlike parallel-case arguments, this justification does not presume close 
analogies between firms and states. The rationale for employee participation in enterprise 
decision-making processes is not that managers have power analogous in scope and 
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magnitude to state agents. Rather, it is simply that they have dominating power, and this 
power frequently has intolerable consequences for people and should be curtailed regardless 
of any resemblances it may share with governmental power. Neither does workplace 
republicanism hinge upon tight parallels between the bindingness of state and enterprise rules 
and the claim that exit from them is similarly costly or constrained. Hsieh accepts that 
membership in firms can be voluntary and endorses the right of exit from economic 
enterprises as a basic right that can have salutary disciplinary effects on managerial 
behaviour. However, it is a mistake to think the right of exit an adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference (Hsieh 2005, pp. 127–131; González-Ricoy 2014, pp. 239–241). This is 
because there are significant costs associated with leaving enterprises – the loss of intra-firm 
personal capital, the expense of transitioning to new jobs, the risk of sustained unemployment 
and being stigmatized as unproductive – that even a substantive right of exit based on 
generous welfare provisions cannot address and which compel many to endure managerial 
domination. The only way to counter such compulsion is to permit contestation of 
management decisions at source. 
 
Autonomy, self-direction and organizational control 
In circumventing difficulties associated with psychological-support and parallel-case 
arguments, workplace republicanism provides an important vindication of employee voice. I 
want now to argue, however, that, while important, this vindication is insufficient, that the 
psychological-support and parallel-case justifications, despite their problematic paths, are 
correct in beginning with a positive ideal of freedom. I begin with two criticisms of Pettit’s 
equation of socio-political freedom with non-domination, namely, that non-domination 
implicitly relies upon freedom conceived as autonomy, and that equating socio-political 
freedom with non-domination distorts our understanding of democracy. These criticisms, I 
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believe, have even greater force against Hsieh’s workplace republicanism, suggesting that 
what is of significance for workers is not only protection against arbitrary managerial 
interference but also, and more fundamentally, the possibility of self-direction and 
organizational control. 
 The claim that republican non-domination trades upon the idea of autonomy and for 
that reason is insufficient has been forcefully made by Richard Dagger. One of Dagger’s 
arguments relates to a basic republican policy prescription. Republicans, Pettit (1997, pp. 76–
77) maintains, should be concerned not only with eliminating those socio-political factors 
which ‘compromise’ freedom, that is, instances of domination, but also with addressing 
natural and social factors – ill health, physical disability, lack of education – which, while not 
involving arbitrary interference, nonetheless limit or ‘condition’ people’s ability to avail of 
their freedom. Dagger (2005, p. 186) believes Pettit right in desiring to counter both 
compromising and conditioning factors, yet his point is that if freedom is ‘construed simply 
as non-domination’ it would be fully served by tackling compromising or dominating factors 
alone. The inclusion of conditioning factors therefore suggests a veiled appeal to a richer 
notion of freedom, not just the absence of domination but of leading ‘a self-governed life’. 
This suspicion is strengthened by consideration of Pettit’s understanding of non-dominated 
personhood, which is strikingly redolent of autonomy and individual self-government 
(Dagger 2005, p. 187). ‘To be a person’, in Pettit’s view, ‘is to be a voice that cannot 
properly be ignored, a voice which speaks to issues raised in common with others and which 
speaks with a certain authority’ (Pettit 1997, p. 91; 2001a, pp. 72, 140). To be a person, in 
other words, is to be worthy of respect, regarded as someone who can arrive at authoritative 
judgements which must be heeded and to whom justifications are owed in the making of 
collective decisions. This understanding clearly goes beyond an ‘absence of mastery by 
others’ to embrace the ‘presence’ of a specific sort of ‘self-mastery’, the ability of persons to 
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independently deliberate over issues and to rationally determine their actions in conjunction 
with others (Forst 2013, pp. 162–163). Indeed, Pettit (1997, p. 81; 2001a, p. 71) concedes that 
he is in the end ‘committed to a version of the autonomy ideal’ in his conception of personal 
agency as ‘discursive control’, the dual capacity of individuals to reason and ‘take part in 
discourse’ and to influence and be influenced in turn by others’ opinions. 
 To enjoy the good of non-domination, in particular a resilient non-domination 
grounded on the capacity of persons to exercise discursive control, is therefore also to enjoy a 
good very much akin to self-determination. The tension generated by Pettit’s endorsement of 
autonomy as essential to human agency and yet his reduction of freedom to non-domination 
in his republican political theory is noticeable. Similarly noticeable are the impoverishing 
effects the reduction of freedom to non-domination has on the ideal of democracy. For Pettit 
(1997, p. 30, emphasis added), democracy’s importance rests simply on ‘the fact that it is a 
means of furthering liberty’ understood as non-domination. Democratic participation is 
valuable, not because of any ‘independent attractions’ or intrinsic relation to freedom, and 
certainly not to freedom understood as self-determination, but rather as an instrument in 
protecting citizens from arbitrary interference (Pettit 1997, p. 8; 1999, p. 166). Democracy 
allows for such protection by permitting citizens to control collective decision making along 
two dimensions: the ‘authorial’ or electoral dimension, in which they act as indirect authors 
of public policy in selecting representatives who are attentive to their interests, and, more 
significant for Pettit generally, the ‘editorial’ or contestatory dimension, in which they 
challenge the decisions of these representatives via institutions such as courts, appeal bodies, 
ombudsmen and so forth (Pettit 2001a, pp. 159–167; 1999, p. 180). As Pettit’s critics see it, 
the problem with this model of democracy is threefold. First, in holding that democratic 
participation has no intrinsic relation to freedom, this model neglects that it is only through 
participation that people can themselves come to understand particular policies or decisions as 
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being in their interest and that ‘being part of processes of self-legislation’ is therefore, in an 
important way, ‘constitutive’ of their status as free and equal citizens (Rostbøll 2008, pp. 56, 
76). Second, emphasizing the contestatory over the authorial dimension and reducing the 
latter to a competition for votes, it ‘moves attention away from the authorization and genesis 
of law’ and discourages ‘any inquiry into or experimentation with institutional forms that 
would enable a more participatory form of democracy’ (Rostbøll 2008, p. 55). Third, prizing 
non-domination over self-determination as the prime political value, it contents itself with an 
attenuated form of democratic control where the tracking of people’s interests is left to 
institutions – political parties, the judiciary, tribunals, expert commissions– presided over by 
professional elites and in which the de facto scope for democratic input is often slight 
(McCormick 2013, pp. 93–113). The overall result is a deflation of the democratic ideal. 
 If these criticisms and those of the previous paragraph hold, then they hold for Hsieh’s 
workplace republicanism as well. As regards the issue of sufficiency, in prioritizing the good 
of ‘self-respect’ in his account of workplace republicanism, Hsieh appears necessarily 
committed, like Pettit, to a conception of personal agency requiring an institutional regime 
which simultaneously protects against arbitrary interference and ensures the ability of 
persons to act in a self-determining manner with others. In fact, close attention to his 
argument reveals self-direction and the enjoyment of discretion play a role in his theory as 
crucial as that played by non-domination. Hsieh’s starting point, we saw above, is the need 
for organizational discretion, and he concurs with Schwartz in thinking ‘working 
relationships, and perhaps work itself, are more meaningful to the extent that they are open-
ended and allow for flexibility’ (Hsieh 2005, p. 136). However, Schwartz’s argument for 
discretion and flexibility in work rests explicitly on the notion of autonomy, and it is against 
that benchmark that she and others comprehend the injustices visited upon employees by 
workplace management practices (Schwartz 1982, pp. 635–639). Key to these practices, as 
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clarified by Braverman (1974, pp. 77–83; see also Murphy 1993) in his critique of Taylorist 
forms of workplace management, are organizational innovations – the increasing emphasis on 
managerial over worker expertise; the division between managers’ role of ‘conception’, of 
designing work processes, and workers’ role of ‘execution’, of carrying these processes out; 
and managerial regulation of all aspects of standardized work systems – that profoundly 
transformed the modern work environment. The negative consequences of these innovations 
for workers can, on one level, be explained in terms of expanded managerial scope for 
arbitrary interference. Yet, on a more basic level, the threat they pose is not only domination 
in the sense understood by Pettit and Hsieh of suffering restricted choice, uncertainty and 
asymmetry of status, but also, and most cuttingly to individuals’ self-worth, the denial to 
workers of what managers enjoy, which is precisely the opportunity both to act in a self-
determining manner and to realize one’s capacities in doing so. 
 Employee dissatisfaction with managerial power stems as much from the 
circumscription of individual autonomy, and the gainsaying of personal dignity 
characterizing this, as it does from experiencing arbitrary interference. Although Hsieh 
certainly recognizes the desire of workers for self-direction in their jobs, his workplace 
republicanism is ill-suited to furthering this desire. This is so because when he speaks of the 
importance of discretion in economic enterprises, it is chiefly of the importance of discretion 
as exercised by managers, not by workers. The success of firms, he insists, hinges on 
managerial discretion, and it is a weakness of many justifications of workplace democracy 
that they pay ‘insufficient attention to the need for managerial decision-making in large-scale 
economic enterprises’ (Hsieh 2005, pp. 116). Hence employees’ right not to organizational 
decision making per se, but instead to participate in decision-making procedures in order to 
contest the decisions made by managers. This view is beset with problems. One problem is 
the assumption that it is managers in the first instance who must decide enterprise policy. 
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Against this, it is not unrealistic to think that most workers, given their immersion in work 
activities, can form opinions on enterprise policy at least as reasonable and knowledgeable as 
the opinions of either stockholders or managers. Moreover, where managerial decision-
making priority is necessary, as in matters requiring advanced technical or logistical 
expertise, this is compatible with according employees the right to determine the domain and 
range of such decision-making priority (Dahl 1985, pp. 118–119). A more telling problem 
with Hsieh’s position, however, is the sanguine assumption that protection against 
domination satisfies the good of self-respect, when a clear import of this good is that all 
should contribute to the determination and control of collective futures. If we take this import 
seriously, then the ‘challenge’, pace Hsieh, is not only to insulate workers from the effects of 
managerial power, but to grant them a share in that power. 
 There are good grounds for doubting whether workplace republicanism as conceived by 
Hsieh can address this demand for an appropriate share in power. His understanding of the 
value of employee participation in enterprise decision making mirrors Pettit’s instrumental 
understanding of the value of citizen participation in the formation of public policy. For both, 
participation is valuable simply insofar as it promotes non-domination. Hsieh is therefore 
open to the criticisms levelled against Pettit’s model of democracy, including that 
participation is to be valued intrinsically as being connected and giving expression to 
people’s freedom as self-governing beings. However, workplace republicanism diverges from 
Pettit’s republican theory in two respects, rendering it vulnerable to further criticism. The 
first is that within Hsieh’s workplace regime the authorial dimension of Pettit’s 
republicanism, of ordinary citizens being the indirect authors of public policy, is not just 
underplayed, as is the case with Pettit, but in fact largely absent. Instead, the emphasis lies 
almost entirely on the contestatory dimension. One implication of this narrow appropriation 
of Pettit’s theory is that authorship of enterprise policy, whether direct or indirect, should not 
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to be thought a prerogative of employees, or at least not a prerogative they should share 
equally with management. The suggestion by Hsieh (2005, p. 138) that worker representation 
in his regime is ‘analogous to the way in which citizens have representation’ in parliament is 
unconvincing, since workers in this regime, unlike citizens in representative democracies, are 
not the ultimate ground and source of decision-making authority. A further implication of the 
emphasis on contestation, reinforced by the primacy accorded managerial discretion, is that 
employee participation in decision-making procedures under workplace republicanism 
amounts in essence to an internal retrospective right of redress, rather than a prospective right 
to shape organizational direction. Such redress may serve workers better than resorting to 
external adjudicative bodies such as labour courts, but it is no substitute for the power 
provided by actively setting agendas and determining enterprise policy. 
 The second respect in which Hsieh diverges from Pettit is of greater significance to the 
question of power. In Pettit’s democratic theory the privileging of non-domination over self-
determination contributes to an attenuated form of popular control, but for Pettit, as for 
proponents of the psychological-support and parallel-case arguments for workplace 
democratization, control remains the central issue in matters of collective governance. Yet 
Hsieh (2008a, p. 93; 2008b, pp. 60) repeatedly makes clear that workplace republicanism is 
distinct from workplace democracy in granting workers a right of contestation but not 
necessarily organizational control, whether this be an exclusive right of control or control 
equal to that exercised by managers. This raises two questions over the attractiveness of 
workplace republicanism as a normative ideal. First, what sort of voice is ensured for workers 
if the right to contest managerial decisions does not necessarily entail some form of 
organizational control? Second, what are the incentives for management to respect workers’ 
basic interests if the right of contestation is not accompanied by binding sanctions? It would 
appear that without significant control, worker voice would be a voice that must be heard, but 
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not one which would have to be acted upon. It would also appear that without controlling 
sanctions, management would be tempted in periods of conflict to disregard the 
recommendations of internal adjudicative bodies and workplace committees. In such 
situations, employees would then have to rely on external institutions, whether courts and 
employment tribunals or unions and the threat of industrial action. Yet this undercuts the 
reason for endorsing workplace republicanism in the first place, which is that these external 
institutions are inadequate to the task of defending employees’ basic interests (Hsieh 2005, 
pp. 135–137). In failing to insist upon the necessary connection between guaranteed voice 
and effective internal employee control, Hsieh thus comes close to destabilizing his project 
overall. 
 In point of fact, Hsieh’s preferred model of workplace governance – co-determination 
as practiced in various coordinated-market economies – does grant workers important 
degrees of organizational control (Addison 2009, pp. 15–23; Müller-Jentsch 1995, pp. 58–
59). In doing so, and despite Hsieh’s (2008b, p. 69) assertion to the contrary, it therefore 
approximates, albeit in modest ways, to the ideal of workplace democracy. The problem, 
ultimately, is that in distancing workplace republicanism from the idea of democratic control, 
Hsieh unduly constrains what is thought possible and desirable in the governance of firms 
and misappreciates the basis of employee protection against arbitrary interference, which is a 
measure of worker discretion and self-direction comparable to the measure of discretion and 
self-direction possessed by managers. But if control – the power and authority to determine 
collective decisions – is the core normative concern, then demands for workplace practices 
that respect the basic interests of all cannot be fulfilled by appeal to the concept of non-
domination alone. Instead, they would seem to also require appeal to the richer notion of 
freedom and personal agency expressed by the positive ideal of living a self-determined life. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued here that workplace republicanism represents an advance on two influential 
freedom-centred arguments for institutionalizing worker voice and should thus be welcomed 
by those opposed to workplace authoritarianism. This advance consists in grounding the case 
for institutional reform not on the benefits it would have for political democracy or on close 
parallels between firms and states, but instead on the severe impact workplace organization 
can have on employees’ lives. However, I have also argued that freedom understood as non-
domination is not fully adequate for the defence of workplace democratization, given its 
implicit dependence on the positive ideal of freedom as autonomy, the inability of non-
domination to properly account for worker dissatisfaction with managerial power and the 
reality that effective protection against arbitrary interference rests on the exercise of 
employee self-direction and organizational control. Together these points suggest the case for 
workplace democracy would be better served if freedom understood as self-determination, 
rather than non-domination, were deemed the primary value. 
 My arguments, of course, by no means amount to a dismissal either of non-domination 
as an ideal or of republicanism as a resource for criticizing authoritarian enterprises: my goal 
has simply been to show that self-determination must figure centrally in the case for 
workplace democratization. Nor have I offered here a comprehensive justification of 
workplace democracy on the basis of self-determination (see Gould 1988; Hyland 1995). I 
would like to conclude, nonetheless, by briefly rebutting the charge that self-determination is 
an inappropriate principle of institutional design. This charge is suggested by Pettit (1997, p. 
82; 2001a, pp. 125–127; see also Pettit in this volume) when he claims the state should 
concern itself solely with the ‘promotion of freedom as non-domination’ and not ‘embrace 
the richer ideal of promoting people’s personal autonomy’. He worries, like Berlin, that were 
the state to take this latter course, it would assume the perfectionist task of imposing a 
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particular model of autonomous citizenship on people and thereby degenerate into ‘an 
intrusive and oppressive entity’. A similar concern prompts Hsieh’s (2008a, p. 84) claim that 
‘thick’ ideals of autonomy entail substantive visions of the good life which render them, in 
line with the principle of neutrality, ‘unlikely candidates for a liberal egalitarian argument for 
workplace democracy’. 
 These worries regarding autonomy are misplaced. One reason for thinking so, most 
obviously, is that there is an important distinction to be made between ‘thick’ ideals of 
autonomy relying on substantive conceptions of the good life and those ‘thin’ ideals which 
focus on the general conditions of being able to lead a good life, whatever one’s conception 
of the good might be. The ideal of personal autonomy appealed to here is concerned simply 
with the conditions of leading a self-governed life, and insofar as the resilient enjoyment of 
non-domination hinges on the satisfaction of these conditions, both Pettit and Hsieh would 
themselves seem committed to institutionally facilitating and promoting that ideal. As regards 
the potential for intrusiveness and oppression, there have been many instances of workplace 
institutional redesign – for example, Volvo’s far-reaching innovations in its Uddevalla 
automotive assembly plant (Breen 2012) – motivated explicitly by the goal of increasing 
worker autonomy and self-direction, and few have posed a threat to anyone’s basic liberties 
or rights, indeed quite the reverse. And even if commitment to the ideal of autonomy does, in 
the end, presume a particular vision of autonomous personhood, this vision is no more 
offensively perfectionist than the republican vision of independent citizenship, of carrying 
ourselves with dignity and interacting with our peers – whether they be ordinary citizens, 
state officials or managers – with confidence, looking them in the eye without feeling the 
need to avert our gaze. 
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